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1 The  Eurasian  Economic  Union  (EEU),  formed  between  Russia,  Belarus,  Kazakhstan,
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, entered into force on January 1, 2015. The EEU stemmed from a
series of initiatives- the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Central Asian
Cooperation  Organization  (CACO),  several  CIS  sub-regional  projects,  the  Eurasian
Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) - which all aimed
at achieving the economic integration of the post-Soviet space’s countries into regional
projects. Taking stock of the inefficiencies and flaws of these organizations, the EEU seeks
to establish a  Customs Union,  several  common markets,  along with the “agreed and
coordinated” policies between its member states. Whereas the economic considerations
played the main role in the creation of the post-Soviet regional projects- most of them
driven  by  Russia-,  the  geopolitical  factors  should  also  be  taken  into  consideration,
especially in the formation of the EEU, which is the outcome of the “regionalist” stage in
Russia’s foreign policy (Molchanov, 2015, p.53). The Foreign Policy concept of the Russia
Federation has a specific chapter which settles the “regional priorities” of the country’s
foreign policy. The creation of the EEU is seen as a matter of utmost importance for the
Russian foreign policy: “Russia sees as a priority the task of establishing the Eurasian
Economic Union aiming not only to make the best use of mutually beneficial economic
ties in the CIS space but also to become a model of association open to other states, a
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model that would determine the future of the Commonwealth states” (“Concept of the
Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”, 2013). At the same time, the EU’s exercise of
“normative power in the post-Soviet space” had been a critical factor in determining
Russia  to  “upgrade  its  approach  to  regional  integration  by  prioritizing  economic
integration  with  a  high  degree  of  institutionalization  and  legalization”  (Delcour  and
Wolczuk,  2013,  p.  202).  The institutionalization and legalization had been carried out
mainly within the ECU’s and EEU’s institutional design by borrowed elements of the EU
project. The diffusion of the EU project’s elements to the post-Soviet regional projects has
not  been  studied  extensively  so  far.  Though,  several  opinions  have  emerged  in  this
regard. Hence, Haukkala argues that “the whole institutional make-up of the proposed
Eurasian Economic Union is built on the EU model” (Haukkala, 2013, p.169). Kazharski
considers that the EEU is a case of “institutional isomorphism” with EU (Kazharski, 2012),
whereas Dragneva and Wolczuk view the ECU as a project “borrowing design elements
from the European Union” (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013, p. 206). 
2 This article argues that, with the creation of the EurAsEC, it has been opened, in the post-
Soviet  space,  the  path  of  the  regional  economic  projects  emulated  by  the  EU.  The
European integration’s emulation has been subsequently manifested with the creation of
the ECU, and notably with that of the EEU. At the same time, the emulation of the EU
project’s  elements in the institutional  design of  the ECU and of  the EEU enabled the
development of integration frameworks highly different-notably in the case of the EEU-
from those of the previous post-Soviet regional integration projects, which had showed
significant institutional failings. However, is yet to be seen whether the emulation of the
EU project’s elements in the institutional design of the EEU would be a factor which
would enhance the economic integration within the EEU and trigger further changes in
the post-Soviet space; that represents a matter of further investigation for the scholars. 
 
2. The economic integration projects preceding the
EEU 
2.1 CIS-a “multitude of legal regimes”, CACO-hindered by lack of
resources and rivalries
3 “Reintegration of the former Soviet republics started almost in parallel to the dissolution
of the USSR itself” (Molchanov, 2015, p. 26). On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Belarus,
Russia and Ukraine signed the “Declaration by the Heads of  State of  the Republic of
Belarus,  the Russian  Soviet  Federative  Socialist  Republic  and  Ukraine”  and  the
“Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of  Independent States” (Voitovich,  1993,
p.404).  These documents declared that “USSR as a subject of  international  law and a
geopolitical reality no longer existed” and stated that Commonwealth of Independent
States (hereafter CIS) was open for membership not only to all ex-USSR’s members states,
but to other states “sharing the purposes and principles of  the founding agreement”
(Ibid.,  2012).  Following a meeting of the five republics of the Central Asia which had
expressed their willingness to join the CIS, on December 21, at the Alma-Ata summit, all
the leaders of the former republics of the Soviet Union, with the exception of Georgia1
and of the three Baltic states, signed the “Alma-Ata Declaration” and the “Protocol to
Commonwealth  Pact”.  According  to  the  Declaration,  the  CIS  is  defined  in  negative
specifications as “neither a state nor a super-state structure”, 
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4 in which the cooperation will be “carried out in accordance with the principle of equality
through coordinating institutions formed on a parity basis” (“Alma Ata Declaration”,
1991). In 1993 the CIS Charter was adopted, but Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan and
Ukraine refrained from signing it. Whereas Azerbaijan maintained its refusal of engaging
in the ratification of CIS Charter, Moldova ratified it in 1994. Turkmenistan adopted “the
formal position of associate member from 2005” and Ukraine “acted as a full member
even though it  never ratified the Charter” (Cooper,  2013,  p.  16).  Similar to Alma-Ata
Declaration,  also  the  Chart  defines  the  CIS  in  negative  terms;  it  states  that
Commonwealth  “isnot  a  state  and  does  not  hold  supranational  powers”,  and  it
emphasizes that the “member states are independent and equal subjects of international
law” (“Charter establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States”). Actually, CIS’s
institutional  development  is  represented  by  “a  multitude  of  legal  regimes  among
different  categories  of  participating States,  including (1)  a  confederation-like nucleus
represented  by  the  States  striving  for  closer  forms  of  cooperation,  and  (2)  a  looser
structure  of  legal  links  with  other  participating  States  based  on  various  types  of
membership, reservations to constituent instruments and selective participation in the
Commonwealth’s legal acts” (Voitovich, 1993, p. 417). 
5 The main aims of the CIS are stated in the provisions of the Charter’s Article 4 and Article
19. Under the Article 4, the aims are: coordination of foreign policy, “cooperation in the
formation  and  development  of  a  common  economic  space,  common  European  and
Eurasian markets, and customs policy”, “cooperation in the sphere of defense policy and
the protection of external borders”. “The formation of a common economic space on the
basis of market relations and free movement of goods, services, capital and labor” are
stated by  the  Article  19.Although the  CIS  aimed at  political  integration through the
aforementioned coordination in  the spheres  of  foreign and defense  policy,  it  mainly
aimed to “preserve essential economic ties within the former Soviet space, while creating
a platform for gradual opening of  the predominantly uncompetitive economies of  its
members states to the global market” (Molchanov, 2015, p. 26). 
6 Nonetheless, the CIS’s economic integration ambitions have been very high from the very
beginning. Hence, in 1993, the CIS countries signed the Treaty on the Establishment of the
Economic  Union,  which  established  a  gradual  process  of  economic  integration.  That
should  have  started  with  the  creation  of  a  free  trade  association,  followed  by  the
establishment of a customs union, and by a common market in which goods, services,
labour and capital would have moved freely and, finally, by the creation of a monetary
union  (Cooper,  2013,  p.  16).  Given  the  heterogeneous  economic  development  of  the
member states,  the  Treaty  did  not  set  up any timeframe for  the establishing of  the
aforementioned integration process (Ibid., 2013). At the same time, the aforementioned
CIS’s “looser structure of legal links” “allowed each member state to determine for itself
its  level  of  engagement”  and  consequently  “reduced  member  states’  continuous
commitment  to  the  organization”  (Wirminghaus,  2012,  p.32).  Further,  the  economic
integration within CIS did not succeed to keep pace with its ambitions, as its starting
point,  the  free  trade  agreement-though  signed  in  1994  by  all  countries,  with  the
exception of Turkmenistan- was not ratified by Russia (Cooper, 2013, p. 17). As a result,
the “trade relations between CIS members countries were regulated by a complex set of
bilateral agreements, many of which were ineffective” (Ibid., 2013). In addition, the free
trade agreements  have not  been shaped up within the CIS framework,  but  “through
bilateral  channels  or  regional  arrangements”  (Webber,  1996,  p.  295).  For  instance,
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between 1992-1994,  Russia  set  up  free  trade  arrangements  with  all  the  CIS  member
countries  ,with the exemption of  Ukraine,  “through a series  of  bilateral  treaties  and
protocols” (Ibid., 1996). 
7 The economic integration in the post-Soviet space continued with a regional project led
by  several  Central  Asian  states.  In  1994,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Uzbekistan
established the  Central  Asian Economic  Union,  aiming at  creating a  single  economic
space;  the three countries also created an Inter-state Council,  a permanent Executive
Committee  and the  Central  Asian Bank for  Cooperation and Development.  Tajikistan
joined  the  organization  in  1998,  which  was  renamed,  in  2002,  the  Central  Asian
Cooperation and the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). But these projects
of regional integration led by the Central Asian countries had not been successful, due “in
part to lack of complementary economic resources and rivalries between Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan for regional dominance” (Kubicek, 2009, p. 246).
8 With regard to CIS, even it failed to achieve its aims of economic integration2,  it  has
succeeded to widen the scope of its activities because “it undertakes considerable activity
of  a  practical  character  facilitating  the  economic,  social, educational  and  cultural
cooperation” between the members countries (Cooper, 2013, p.31). More, in October 2011,
Armenia,  Belarus,  Moldova,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Russia,  Tajikistan  and  Ukraine
signed  the  CIS’s  Free  Trade  Agreement.  Uzbekistan  signed  the  agreement  in  2012,
whereas Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan decided not to join it. 
 
2.2 The CIS sub-regional projects led by Russia
9 In parallel with the regional projects of the Central Asian countries, Russia took the realm
in forming and further leading several CIS sub-regional projects. In 1996, Russia, Belarus
and Kazakhstan signed the treaty for the creation of a Customs Union. Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan joined this organization in 1996, respectively in 1997. Also, in 1996, Russia and
Belarus signed an agreement to form the Community of Sovereign Republics.The treaty
envisaged the creation of a common single currency for the two countries by the end of
1997, as well as “a common budget, a common customs system, and common taxation and
investment laws” (Danilovich, 2006, p.60).  A year later,  Russia and Belarus signed the
Union Treaty, and in 1999 formalized a far more reaching agreement, named “Treaty on
the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus”. The treaty enabled the creation of a
common presidency, a common constitution, common army and common citizenship.
Nevertheless,  mainly due to the political  frictions between the presidents of  the two
states-Vladimir  Putin  and  Alexander  Lukashenko-the  project  of  the  abovementioned
Union was watered down. 
10 As  it  was  aforementioned,  Russia,  Belarus,  Kazakhstan  and  Tajikistan  initiated  the
establishment of a customs union, but “that remained little more than a declaration of
intent, with limited action to develop a real, functioning union” (Cooper, 2013, p. 18).
Further, the Kyrgyzstan’s accession into the World Trade Organization and the financial
crisis  occurred in Russia in 1998 showed the failings of  the existing CIS-sub regional
projects driven by Russia and the necessity to establish other organization aiming at
economic integration. 
11 Therefore, in 1999, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan signed the Treaty on the
Customs Union and the Single Economic Space. The following year, “the grouping was
transformed  into  a  fully-fledged  international  organization,  the  Eurasian  Economic
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Community” (Dragneva and Wolczuk,  2012,  p.4).  The treaty establishing the Eurasian
Economic  Community  (EurAsEC)  became  effective  in  20013.  EurAsEC  set  up  an
institutional framework inspired from the EU acquis and opened the path of a series of
EU- emulated projects of economic integration in the post-Soviet area. In 2003, Russia’s
integration initiatives involved Ukraine in the creation of  the Single Economic Space
(SES), which included also Belarus and Kazakhstan. Though the SES Treaty was ratified by
all the signing countries, the SES process faced a strong domestic opposition in Ukraine.
After  the  2004  Orange  Revolution,  Kiev’s  manifested  reluctance  with  regard  to  the
pooling of sovereignty grew up; therefore, Ukraine advocated for the creation of a free
trade area, opposing the project of a single economic space. Therefore, by the end of 2005,
the SES project including the four countries was halted.
12 At the same time, in 2005, Russia succeeded in merging the organization of the Central
Asia’s republics, CACO, with the EurAsEC, which “inherited several CACO’s portfolios as
ecology, the hydropower-water supply nexus, health care and the burial of mining sites” (
Molchanov,  2015,  p.40).  Consequently,  by  2006,  the  EurAsEC  consisted  of  five  full
members: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia,  Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and
three observer members: Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine (Molchanov, 2015, p.41). 
13 The goal of establishment of a customs union between EurAsEC countries was uphold, but
not all its members appeared committed to establish it. Therefore, in 2006, at an informal
summit  meeting of  EurAsEC,  Russia,  Kazakhstan and Belarus  decided to  set  up their
integration by creating the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), followed, a year later, by the
signing of a treaty. The three countries set up the Commission of the Customs Union and
on January 1, 2010, it was launched a common external tariff, followed in July 2010 by the
Customs  Union  Code.  Though  in  June  2009  Vladimir  Putin  announced  that  the  new
Customs Union would join the WTO as a single entity,  it soon became clear that this
decision would “inevitably delay Russia’s  accession” to the WTO (Cooper,  2013,  p.23).
Hence, the position shifted to the pursuit of separate negotiations for WTO’s accession
(Ibid., 2013). In July 2011, the internal physical border controls were eliminated. Though
the SES project had failed by Ukraine’s withdrawal, it will be driven forward mainly by
political will and on November 18, 2011, the leaders of the three countries forming the
Customs Union signed the Declaration on Eurasian Economic Integration. The document
proclaimed the parties’ willingness to complete by January 1st 2015 the codification of
international agreements comprising the legal basis of the Customs Union and SES and
the  creation  of  the  Eurasian  Economic  Union.  On  January,  1,  2015,  the  SES  became
operational and on February 2, 2012, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) replaced
the Customs Union Commission as the permanent supranational regulatory body of the
Customs Union and SES.
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3. Borrowed EU projects’ elements in ECU’s and EEU’s
institutional design and EEU’s scope and policies 
3.1 ECU-an institutionalized legal regime with binding effects,
enhanced by transferred competences and a supranational
bureaucracy 
14 The creation of  the  ECU shows the goal  of  pursuing enhanced economic  integration
through  a  high  degree  of  coordination  and  harmonization  of  economic  policies.  As
Dragneva and Wolczuk indicate (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013, p. 205-206) , this goal has
been  strengthened  by  “the  creation  of  a  highly  institutionalized  and  binding  legal
regime”, whose regulations become part of the domestic legal regime , which extends
“delegation of key domestic-policy making powers to a common institution, the Eurasian
Economic  Commission  (EEC)”  and  strengthens  the  cooperation  between  the  parties
“through the directly binding effect to the EEC’s decisions as well as improved dispute
resolution through the Court”4. More, the EEC “represents a more radical step towards
the  formation  of  a  developed  supranational  bureaucracy  entrusted  with  extensive
functions”  (Dragneva,  2013,  p.53).  Further,  the  way  in  which  the  members  of  the
Collegium-one of the two structures of the EEC – were supposed to perform their duties
was also in “EU-style”: they should have acted in an independent manner, without being
allowed to receive or request directions from the members states (Dragneva, 2013, p.54)
15 5678
16 According to its  founding Treaty,  set  up in 2011,  the EEC is  “the single permanently
functioning  regulatory  body  of  the  Customs  Union  and  the  Single  Economic  Space”
(Dragneva,  2013,  p.50).  As  Blockmans,  Kostanyan  and  Vorobiov  indicate  (Blockmans,
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Kostanyan  and  Vorobiov,  2012,  p.13-14),  the  EEC  was  endowed  with  legislative  and
executive powers.  The legislative powers regard the rights  to generate proposals  for
economic  integration  within  ECU  and  SES,  to  adopt  technical  regulations  directly
applicable to the member states and to issue decisions (legal acts binding on the member
states) and recommendations (legal acts non-binding on the member states). Although it
has the right to create secondary legislation, the EEC’s legislative role is limited by the
scope of the Interstate Council’s decisions, as defined by the ECU’s legal regime (Ibid.,
p.14).  The  EEC’s  executive  powers  fall  in  the  area  of  monitoring  the  legislation’s
implementation and the violations of ECU’s law (Blockmans et al., p. 13). 
17 The EEC’s structure is made up by the Council and the Board. The Board, consisting of the
deputy heads of each state, is responsible for the main decisions of the common customs
policy  and  the  key  decisions  “in  relation  to  the  main  areas  of  cooperation  and
harmonization  within  the  SES”  (Dragneva,  2013,  p.53).  The  Board,  designed  as  an
“executive organ” of the EEC, is composed by the members nominated by the members
states,  three  for  each state;  it  was  “seen as  a  professional  body independent  of  the
members states” (Dragneva, 2013, p.54). Yet, the vote weigh within the EEC reflects a
limited supranational delegation. Hence, the vote in the Council is taken by unanimity,
whereas the vote in the Board may be taken either by unanimity, either by two-thirds
majority, though the latter procedure applies only to a limited range of issues.
18 The  key-binding  effects  of  ECU’s  institutionalized  regime  spill  from  the  Interstate
Council’s decisions, the EEC’s decisions, the EEC’s powers to oversee the application of the
ECU’s law and the decisions of the Court of EurAsEC (hereafter the Court).  The EEC’s
powers to oversee the application of the ECU’s law and the decisions of the Court are
borrowed from the EU acquis. Thus, if a member state breaches the provisions of ECU
Treaty or a decision of EEC, the Board, with two-thirds vote, may notify the member state
on the elimination of the breach. In case the member state fails to comply, the mater is
transferred to the Council,  which,  in the situation of  the persistent breach from the
member  state,  can refer  the  case  to  the  Court  (Blockmans  et  al.,  p.16).  The  Court’s
decisions are binding on parties. 
19 In  sum,  the  ECU,  borrowing  elements  from  the  EU  integration  project,  attempts  to
establish an institutionalized legal regime with binding effects, enhanced by a dispute
resolution mechanism, transferred competences and a supranational bureaucracy.
20 “These features suggest a similarity with the European integration model which is heavy
on  legalization  and  institutionalization,  with  rigid  decision-making  processes  and
functional spillover into new areas of integration (…) While borrowing design elements
from the European Union (EU) is not unheard of, the ECU has demonstrated an unusual
willingness to adopt legalized forms of structuring cooperation” (Dragneva and Wolczuk,
2013, p.206).
21  Regardless  its  aim  of  strengthen  the  integration  through  the  abovementioned
legalization  and  institutionalization,  the  ECU  was  not  set  up  as  an  international
organization, but as a “treaty-based regime within” the EurAsEC, which was set up as a
“fully-fledged  international  organization  (…)  with  separate  legal  personality  and  the
ability to sign international agreements “(Dragneva, 2013, p.37). However, the ECU takes
over  the  agreements  concluded  within  the  EurAsEC  and  develops  its  organizational
structure within the framework of EurAsEC “on the basis of amendments” to the Treaty
of the EurAsEc (Dragneva, 2013, p.38). 
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3.2 EEU-upgrading the ECU acquis into an international legal regime
with further borrowed elements from the EU project
22 Before outlining the institutional design of EEU, I will proceed to a brief presentation of
the context in which that was set up. A principal rationale of the EEU’s nascent is the
competition between Russia and the EU in the post-Soviet space (Adomeit, 2012; Cadier,
2014). With the launching of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 and “the
accession of the Central and European Countries the same year, the EU had gained a new
Eastern  border  with  the  post-Soviet  space”  (Cadier,  2014,  p.61).  After  the  Eastern
enlargement,  establishment  of  ENP  and  Ukraine’s  Orange  Revolution,  “Moscow  has
decided to treat the EU’s presence in the region largely in a classical zero-sum manner”
(Haukkala, 2013, p. 173). That might be explained by the fact that “the Russian elites
frame international relations in general in terms of fierce competition and consequent
spheres of interests and influence” (Ibid., 2013). Hence, the EEU can be seen not only as
Russia’s attempt to counter the EU’s influence in its spheres of influence, but to merely
delineate and secure these spheres from others competitors’ emergence notably China’s.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Beijing has been emerging as a player in Central Asia,
continuously consolidating its economic engagement with the countries of the region,
especially in the energy sphere9. But EEU is more than Moscow’s attempt to delimitate its
spheres of influence: it represents Russia’s challenge to EU’s “transformative power”, that
Moscow “has sought  to emulate it”  (Cadier,  2014,  p.62).  As Haukkala sees  ECU as  “a
serious attack against the EU normative hegemony”, its upgraded version, the EEU, can
be seen in the same perspective.
23 Unlike  the  ECU,  the  EEU  is  established  as  a  fully-fledged  international  regional
organization, as the founding Treaty states in Article 1, al.  2:  “The Union shall be an
international organisation of regional economic integration and shall have international
legal personality”. 
24  The EEU Treaty sets up a far broader legal regime than that of ECU’s. Hence, the EEU
jurisdiction is  defined not  only  “within the  scope and limits  determined” under  the
Treaty (Article 5, al.1) but also in relation with the “coordinated or agreed policies” of the
member states(Article 5, al.2) . The coordinated or agreed policies must be either “within
the scope and limits” determined under the Treaty and international treaties within the
Union (Article 5, al.2) or “in accordance with the basic principles and objectives of the
Union” (Article 5, al.3). The law of the EEU is clearly defined by the Article 6 of the Treaty
and it is represented by the EEU Treaty, the international treaties within the EEU, the
international treaties of the EEU with a third party, the decisions and dispositions of the
Supreme  Eurasian  Economic  Council  (hereafter  Supreme  Council),  the  Eurasian
Intergovernmental  Council  (hereafter  Intergovernmental  Council)  and  the  Eurasian
Economic Commission (hereafter Commission). In case of conflict between the decisions
of the bodies of the EEU, the Supreme Council’s decisions prevail on the decisions of the
Intergovernmental  Council  and  the  Commission’s,  whereas  the  Intergovernmental
Council’s decisions prevail on the decisions of the Commission. 
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25 The adoption of  decisions  by consensus  within the  EEU’s  Supreme Council  might  be
primarily  explained  by  the  necessity  to  accommodate  the  political  sensibilities  of
member-states,  notably Kazakhstan.  Thus,  since 2011,  the Kazakhstan’s president had
expressed the position that the EEU should not interfere with the countries’ sovereignty;
he also had stated that the integration process should be based on the countries’ free will
and equal rights. In the same vein-and following the stance of sovereignty’s preservation
and equal rights treatment- Nursultan Nazarbayev declared, before the signing of the
EEU’s  Treaty,  that  the  document  “enshrines  the  principles  of  sovereign  equality,
territorial integrity and respect for the particularities of the political apparatus of the
union members”; “the important point is that the principle of consensus in decision-
making is  implemented at  all  levels”11,  he  added.  By  securing a  consensus  vote,  the
member states also secured several important elements: equal position within the highest
level of decision-making process, further room for maneuver to negotiate weighty issues
and even the capacity to oppose them. 
26 The binding effects of the legal regime emerge from the decisions issued by the Supreme
Council, the Intergovernmental Council, the Commission and the decisions of the Court of
the Eurasian Economic Union (hereafter the Court)12. 
27 The EEU Treaty introduces a mechanism of dispute resolution with regard to the disputes
related to its implementation, the implementation of the treaties within the EEU and the
decisions of the bodies of the EEU. Both the member states and the economic actors can
lodge with the Court, though the latter can do it only in matters related to the decisions
of the Commission. 
28 The supranational delegation is reflected, as in the case of ECU, by the creation of the
Commission as “supranational bureaucracy”. Nevertheless, its powers are bound by the
Intergovernmental  Council’s  powers13.  The  Commission  is  the  “permanent  governing
body” of the EEU and it consists of the Council and the Board (Art.16, al.1). The Council
carries out the Commission’s general regulations and management whereas the Board is
the  Commission’s  executive  body,  composed by  the  members  states’  representatives,
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“based on principle of equal representation of the member states” (Annex 1 of the Treaty,
article 31). Though, the supranational delegation is limited by three main elements: the
composition of the Council (formed by the deputy heads of governments, one per each
state member), the Council’s powers (whose scope overpasses the powers of the Board)
and the procedure of the nomination of the Board’s members (the Supreme Council is the
body which determines the number of the Board’s members, their responsibilities and the
termination of their powers). There are several important elements characteristic to a
supranational bureaucracy, such as : the compulsory condition of professional experience
for the Board’s members (at least seven years in the area related to their official duty,
including one year in a senior management position at a public authority); the definition
of the activity of the Board’s members as independent of all authorities of the member
states; the restriction for the Board’s members to engage in other paid activities except
for teaching, research and creative activities; and a series of provisions (restrictions and
ethic regulations) regulating the way in which the Board’s members exercise their powers
14. 
29 The  Commission  exercises  its  powers  in  a  wider  range  of  areas  than  the  former
Commission of ECU. These areas are : customs tariff and non-tariff regulation; customs
regulations;  technical  regulations;  sanitary,  veterinary-sanitary  and  phytosanitary
quarantine measures; transfer and distribution of import customs duties; establishment
of trade regimes for third parties; statistics of foreign and mutual trade; macroeconomic
policy; competition policy; industrial and agricultural subsidies; energy policy; natural
monopolies;  state  and/or  municipal  procurement;  mutual  trade  in  services  and
investments; transport and transportation; monetary policy; intellectual property; labour
migration;  financial  markets (banking,  insurance,  the currency market,  the securities
market).  On  matters  which  fall  under  its  competences,  the  Commission  can  sign
international treaties, though only if the Supreme Council vests it. 
30 As it was aforementioned, the Board is the executive body of the Commission and it is
endowed with a  wide range of  executive powers,  such as:  the adoption of  decisions,
dispositions and recommendations; the implementation of the legal acts issued by the
Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council and of the decisions adopted by the
Council of the Commission; the implementation of the international treaties forming the
EEU law and of the decisions of the Commission; the representation of the Commission’s
interests  in  courts,  including the  Court  of  the  Union and more.  The  Board has  also
legislative powers, though limited in scope as it is enabled to develop its own proposals
and to compile proposals of the member states in the areas of integration within the EEU. 
31 Another  EU-emulated  influence  over  EEU  is  represented  by  the  setting  up  of  two
categories of policies: “agreed” and “coordinated”. The “coordinated” policies are defined
as policies “implying the cooperation between the Member States on the basis of common
approaches approved within Bodies of the Union and required to achieve the objectives of
the Union”; the “agreed” policies are “policies implemented by the Member States in
various areas suggesting the harmonization of legal regulations, including on the basis of
decisions of the Bodies of the Union, to the extent required to achieve the objectives of
the Union” (Article 2). The agreed policies are conducted in the “sphere of application of
sanitary, veterinary-sanitary and phytosanitary quarantine measures” (Article 56, al.2);
consumer protection (Art.  31,  al.1),  macroeconomic area (Art.62,  al.1);  monetary area
(Art.64, al.1); regulation of financial markets (Art.70, al. 1); antitrust area- but only in
relation with actions of economic entities of the third countries affecting the competition
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in commodity markets of the member states (Art. 74, al.4); agricultural area (Art.94, al.1).
The coordinated policies cover the following areas: taxation (Art.71, al.1); energy (Art. 79,
al.1);  transport  (Art.  86,  al.1),  intellectual  property  (Art.  89),  industrial  cooperation
(art.92), the rules for granting subsidies for industrial goods (Art.93, al.1); labor migration
(Art. 96, al.1). The introduction of the “agreed” and “coordinated” policies, along with the
top-dawn decision-making system, is a clear indication that, unlike the EU project, the
EEU’s member states have yet not conceded to pool their sovereignty. 
32 According to the EEU Treaty, the Union aims at going beyond the Customs Union of the
four  freedoms (goods,  services,  capital  and labor)  as  it  intends  the  establishment  of
several common markets of : medicines (to enter into force by January 1, 2016); medical
devices (to enter into force by January 1, 2016); electric power (to enter into force by July
1, 2019); gas (to enter into force by January 1, 2025); oil and petroleum products (to enter
into force by January 2025); transportation services (date of entry into force not specified
); common financial market (date of entry into force not specified); common market of
services (date of entry into force not specified). Within these markets, the common rules
of  competition  shall  be  ensured;  unlike  the  EU’s  regulations,  these  rules  accept  the
existence of  two elements inexistent  in the EU acquis:  the “dominant position of  an
economic entity” (Annex 19, art.3) and the “natural monopoly entities”. The latter are
clearly defined and represent: transportation of gas and oil via pipelines; transmission
and  distribution  of  electricity;  railway  transportations,  storage  service  and
transportation of  marketable gas;  services of  air  transportation;  services of  transport
terminals and airports;  public telecommunications services and public postal  services
(Annex 20). Besides the abovementioned common markets, the EEU aims at creating a
common economic space and achieving convertibility of the currencies of the member
states.  In  this  regard,  the  EEU Treaty  introduces  economic  indicators  similar  of  the
Maastricht convergence criteria:  the annual  deficit  of  the consolidated budget of  the
“state-controlled” sector must not exceed 3 percent of the GDP, the debt of the “state-
controlled sector” must be less than 50 percent of the GDP, the annual inflation rate
cannot exceed “the inflation rate in the Member State with the lowest value by not more
than 5% “. (Art.63). 
33 Therefore, by taking over the ECU acquis and many further borrowed elements of the EU
project,  the EEU attempts  to  establish an institutionalized legal  regime with binding
effects,  enhanced  by  dispute  resolution  mechanism,  transferred  competences  and  a
supranational bureaucracy The EU emulation is wider in the EEU’s institutional design
than  in  the  ECU’s,  as  it  has  inspired  the  introduction  of  the  restrictions  and  ethic
regulations of the Board’s members, the creation of “agreed” and “coordinated” policies,
the further establishment of the common markets and of a common economic space,
ruled by economic convergence criteria. 
 
4. Conclusions
34 The  process  of  regional  economic  integration  in  the  post-Soviet  space  initiated
immediately almost in the same time with the dissolution of the USSR and it started with
the  CIS,  which  was  set  up  as  a  “multitude  of  legal  regimes”.  Despite  its  economic
integration ambitions, the CIS did not succeed in achieving its aims, a principal cause
being  the  failings  of  its  institutional  design.  Further,  the  attempts  of  Central  Asian
republics  to  set  up  regional  economic  projects  have  been  hindered  by  the  lack  of
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economic  resources  and  inter-state  rivalries.  Nor  the  subsequent  CIS-sub  regional
projects  led  by  Russia  by  2000  have  been  more  successful  in  achieving  economic
integration,  due to  either  their  weak institutional  design or  the political  dissensions
between the member states’ leaders. 
35 The  creation  of  a  new  project  driven  by  Russia,  the  EurAsEC,  whose  institutional
framework was inspired by the European integration project, opened the path for a series
of regional project in the post Soviet-space which will be further emulated by the EU
project. At the same time, the establishment of the EurAsEC indicates Russia’s willingness
to  approach  the  regional  economic  integration within  highly  institutionalized  and
legalized frameworks. 
36 Therefore, through the borrowing of elements of the EU project, both the ECU and the
EEU have attempted to  establish  institutionalized legal  regimes  with binding effects,
enhanced  by  dispute  resolution  mechanisms,  transferred  competences  and  a
supranational bureaucracy. Furthermore, the EU emulation influences many other
aspects of the EEU’s institutional design, such as the introduction of the restrictions and
ethic regulations of the Board’s members, the creation of the “agreed” and “coordinated”
policies, the further establishment of the common markets and of a common economic
space ruled by economic convergence criteria.  Would the EU emulation trigger more
enhanced economic integration within the EEU? Would it determine further changes in
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NOTES
1. Georgia joined the CIS in December 1993. In 2006, seeking the NATO membership, Georgia
withdrew from the CIS Council of Defense Ministers. Further, in August 2008, as a consequence of
Russia’s support to the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and of the
Russian-Georgian military confrontations, Georgia withdrew unilaterally from the organization.
The withdrawal was completed in 2009. 
2.  The post –Soviet countries set up two organizations of regional cooperation in the military
sphere:  the  Collective  Security  Treaty  Organization  (CSTO),  established  by  Armenia,  Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan in 2000 and GUAM, created by Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova  and  Ukraine  in  1996.  Uzbekistan  became  GUAM’s  fifth  member  in  1999,  when  the
organization became GUUAM, but it withdrew in 2012. Given the scope of this study, I will not
further analyze CSTO and GUAM. 
3.  In 2002, Moldova and Ukraine became observers, followed by Armenia, in 2003. Uzbekistan
signed the Treaty in 2006, but it suspended its membership in 2008. 
4.  As it will be further showed in Note 7, the judicial body remains the Court of EurAsEC, but in
2010 its Statute was modified to better accommodate the new institutional developments. 
5.  The Interstate Council of the EurAsEC adopts binding decisions on member states, which must
directly  implement  them;  resolutions  binding  to  the  result  to  be  achieved  and  non-binding
recommendations (Dragneva, 2013, p.48).
6.  The Interstate Council of EC is the EurAsEC Council in a reduced format, consisting of Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan and it was set up by amendment to the Treaty of EurAsEc (Dragneva,
2013, p. 38)
7.  The Commission of the Customs Union, the permanent regulatory body, was established in
2007  by  a  separate  Treaty  between  Russia,  Kazakhstan  and  Belarus;  its  decisions  are  made
binding  on  the  ECU’s  member  states  and  become  automatically  part  of  the  national  law
(Dragneva, 2013, p.50). The main part of the vote distribution was acquired by Russia, with 47
votes, whereas Belarus and Kazakhstan held 21.5 votes each
8.  The new Statute of the Court, adopted in 2010, extends its competences to the decisions of the
ECU’s bodies and the disputes between the Commission and the member states on matters arising
from the implementation of the ECU’s regulations and allows the commercial stakeholders to
appeal to the Court. It also defines the Court’s decisions as binding. (Dragneva, 2013, p.57).
9.  China sealed various important energy deals with the Central Asia’s countries. For instance,
the Chinese companies undertook large acquisitions in the Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sectors, and
a gas pipeline running from Atasu (Kazakhstan) to Alashankou (China) became operational in
2006. In 2014, China was the main destination for Kazakhstan’s exports, mainly oil and mineral
fuels.  Further,  China and Turkmenistan signed a  deal  in  2007,  operational  since 2009,  under
which the latter sells annually 30 billion cubic meters of gas until 2039. 
10.  The list of “sensitive issues” is, according to the Article 18, al.2 of the EEU treaty, established
by the Supreme Council
11.  Prime  Minister  of  Kazakhstan’s  official  website  (2014):  “Kazakh  President  Nursultan
Nazarbayev stresses equality of all participants of Eurasian Economic Union”, available at http://
primeminister.kz/news/show/21/prezident-kazahstana-nnazarbaev-podcherknul-printsip-
ravnopravija-dlja-vseh-uchastnikov-eaes/29-05-2014?lang=en , accessed November 17, 2015
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12.  The  Court  consists  of  two  judges  from  each  member  state,  who  are  appointed  by  the
Supreme Council on the proposal of the member states. The term of office of a judge is nine
years. 
13.  The Intergovernmental Council has the right to “consider, on the proposal of the Council of
the Commission, any issues for which no consensus was reached during decision-making in the
Council of the Commission” (Art.16, al.2 ); to “issue instructions to the Commission” (Art. 16,
al.3); to consider “any issues relating to the cancellation or amendment of a decision issued by
the Commission“ (Art16, al.7); to “decide on suspension of decisions of the Council or the Board
of the Commission” (Art.16, al. 8). 
14.  In this regard, it is worth mentioning that some of these provisions have certain similarities
with the provisions of the EU’s Staff Regulation. 
ABSTRACTS
The process of regional economic integration in the post-Soviet space was initiated almost in the
same time with the dissolution of URSS. It started with the establishment of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), followed by regional initiatives-which were led by the Central Asian
republics-, and the CIS sub-regional projects, driven by Russia. However, before the creation of
the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC),  these projects of economic integration showed
significant failings of their institutional design. The creation of the EurAsEC indicates Russia’s
new approach of regional economic integration in the post-Soviet space. That approach will be
further carried out through a high degree of institutionalization and legalization and by an EU-
emulated  institutional  design.  The  EU  emulation  has  been  subsequently  manifested  in  the
creation of the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), and notably in that of the Eurasian Economic
Union (EEU). Both organizations establish institutionalized legal regimes with binding effects,
enhanced  by  dispute  resolution  mechanisms,  transferred  competences  and  a  supranational
bureaucracy. Further, the EU emulation is wider in the EEU’s institutional design than in the
ECU’s, as it has inspired not only the introduction of restrictions and ethic rules regulating the
activity  of  the  EEU’s  supranational  bureaucracy,  but  also  the  creation  of  “agreed”  and
“coordinated” policies, and the further establishment of the common markets and of a common
economic space, ruled by economic convergence criteria. 
Le  processus  d’intégration  économique  régionale  dans  l’espace  post-soviétique  a été
initiépresque dans le même temps avec la dissolution de l’URSS. Il a commencé avec la création
de la Communauté des Etats indépendants (CEI), suivi par les initiatives régionales menées par
les républiques d’Asie centrale et les projets sous-régionaux de la CEI entraînés par la Russie.
Toutefois,  avant  la  création  de  la  Communauté  économique  eurasiatique  (CEEA),  ces  projets
d’intégration  économique  ont  montré  lacunes  importantes  concernant  la  conception
institutionnelle. La création de la CEEA indique la nouvelle approche de la Russie sur l’intégration
économique régionale dans l’espace post-soviétique, qui sera désormais effectuée par un haut
degré  d’institutionnalisation  et  de  légalisation  et  par  l’émulation  du  projet  européen  dans
l’architecture institutionnelle des nouvelles institutions. Par la suite, l’émulation de l’UE s’est
manifestée  dans  la  création  de  l’Union douanière  eurasiatique  (UDA),  et  notamment  dans  la
création de l’Union économique eurasiatique (UEEA). Ces organisations établissent des régimes
juridiques  institutionnalisés  avec  des  effets  contraignants,  renforcés  par  des  mécanismes  de
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règlement des différends,  par le  transfert  des compétences et  la  création d’une bureaucratie
supranationale. D’avantage, l’émulation de l’UE se manifeste plus largement dans la conception
institutionnelle de l’UEEA que dans celle de l’UDA, car elle a inspiré non seulement l’introduction
des restrictions et des règles d’éthique régissant l’activité de la bureaucratie supranationale, mais
également la création des politiques «convenus» et «coordonnées», et la future mise en place des
marchés communs et d’un espace économique commun.
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